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Shadow Wages and Induced Migration
Christopher J. Heady*
The purpose of this paper is to show tha.t the "shadow wage", which
is used'in evaluating government industrial projects, should be close to
the actual wage in manufacturing under more general conditions than those
assumed by Harris and Todaro (1970).

Harris and Todaro argued that because

of induced migration, the use of a shadow wage significantly below the
actual wage would be harmful.

1

Their model can be criticised on the grounds
• 2

that, for several reasons, induced migration is not as great as they predicted.
This naturally raises the possibility that the shadow wage should be sub
stantially lower than the market wage.
However, the wor~ tmtil now has assumed that the aim of government
policy is to maximize the value of measured national income. 3 This objective
neglects other elements of individuals' utilities, such as the extent of
risk and a possible preference for remaining in a rural area.

It is precisely

these elements of utility that will cause the level of migration to be lower
than that predicted by Harris and Todaro.

The present paper reformulates

the Harris and Todaro model in terms of utility:

workers decide to migrate

on the basis of their expected utilities rather than their expected incomes,
and the government's objective is to maximise the sum of utilities.

Thus,

in this paper, utilities replace income and the rest of the mdoel is un
changed.

It is demonstrated that, with this modification, the shadow wage

in manufacturing should be close to the market wage however strong are the
forces which reduce migration.

The intuition behind this result can

*The aucnor is grateful to Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Richard A. Brecher,
Lucy Cardwell, Alice Knight and Gustav Ranis for their helpful comments and
discussion.
1
This argument is also made in Harberger (1971) and is expressed
particularly clearly in Sen (1975).
2
3

See, for example, Fields (1975).

This assumption is either explicit or implicit in Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1974), Harberger (1971), Harris and Todaro (1970), Little and Mirrlees (1974)
and UNIDO (1972).

-2be obtained by reformulating Sen's (1975) 4 argument to show that the gain
in utility from transfering an extra worker from agriculture to the manufactur
ing sector is exactly balanced by the loss in utility from those leaving
agriculture and failing to find employment.

5

Thus total utility is not

increased_by ~mployment in manufacturing even though the value of the national
income will have risen if the level of migration is less than that predicted
by Harris and Todaro.

The reason for this conflict between output and

utility is that the additional output was bought at the cost of inducing more
people to take the risk of migrating and of moving people from the country
side into the towns.

This implies that the mere observation of unemployment

rates lower than those predicted by Harris and Todaro does not imply that
the shadow wage in manufacturing should be significantly lower than the actual
wage.
Before proceeding, two points should be noted.

First, this paper

neglects that component of the shadow wage waich is due to the reduction
in government funds available for investment as a result of the wage payment.

6

Second, although the result presented here is consistent with the results of
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974), the problem considered here is different.
4sen does not mention that, as is demonstrated below, it is necessary
to assume a constant marginal product in agriculture for the result to apply
exactly.
5For example, suppose that the utility level in manufacturing is two,
that in agriculture one, and that the unemployed have zero utility. In this
case, half of the urban population would be unemployed. If one worker is
than transferred from agriculture to manufacturing, that worker will gain
one unit of utility. However, this move will induce an additional worker
to migrate in order to aaintain the urban unemployment rate. This second
worker will lose one unit of utility, cancelling out the gain of the first
worker.
6As pointed out by Sen (1960), this component of the shadow wage can
be important. However, this can only increase the shadow wage (see UNIDO (1972)
and Little and Mirrlees (1974)) and so does not affect the main point of this paper.

-3Bhagwati and Srinivasan consider the optimal government policy towards the
economy as a whole, while this paper looks at the problem of a project
evaluator who can choose the shadow wage but cannot influence other aspects
of government policy.
In the next section, the basic model will be described and the main
result will be obtained.
demonstrate the result.

The model will be the simplest possible that can
It will also incorporate assumptions about the

search mechanism and the payment of marginal products in agriculture that
will not exactly correspond to reality in any country.

These points and

their relation to the basic result are discussed in the conclusion.

These

qualifications mean that the result should not be interpreted as a definite
injunction to use the manufacturing wage as the shadow wage.

Rather, the

result implies that a government which is concerned with more than just
maximizing its measured national income should use a shadow wage that is
higher than the agricultural output foregone as a result of induced migration.
The Basic Model
The model is almost identical to that used by Harris and Todaro.

The

economy comprises two sectors, Agriculture and Manufacturing, each of which
produce a single internationally traded good.
the price of each good is unity.

7

7

We will choose units so that

Each sector has a production function:

XA ,;:: FA(LA)

(1)

~ =

(2)

FM(LM)

The assumption that the goods are traded is simply a device to fix
the relative output prices. It does not affect the results in any way.

-4where LA, LM are the quantities of labor employed in agriculture and manu
facturing.

XA,

~

are thequ&1:ities of goods produced by agriculture and

manufacturing.
The fundamental distortion i.n this model, and the one that causes the
migration, is the payment of a fixed real wage,

W,
m

in the manufacturing

sector that is higher than the wage paid in agricultu~e.

The latter is

determined by the marginal product of labor in agriculture:
WA• F' A

(3)

where WA is the wage in agriculture
F'A is the marginal product of labor in agriculture.
In order to avoid complications associated with the distributional
impact of reats and profits, it is assumed that the government receives
all the profits from manufacturing and distributes them equally to the whole
population.

We also assume that land is equally distributed and that people

continue to receive rent·after they have migrated.

Thus, if we normalise

the population size to equal unity, each person receives an unearned income,
D, given by:

We can now describe the migration mechanism.

This paper follows Harris

and Todaro in assuming that the probability of a migrant obtaining employment
in manufacturing is given by the proportion of the urban workforce that are
employed.

However, it is the purpose of this paper to incorporate three

factors that reduce migration below the level predicted by Harris and Todaro.
These are:
1)

Workers are risk averse.

2)

The cost of living is higher in the cities than in the countryside.

3)

There are non-pecuniary advantages to living and working in rural areas.

-sItems Ci) and (3) imply that income is not a satisfactory indicator of
the 'true utility' of living in each area.

Thus workers in agriculture

will have a different utility function (in terms of income) from those
who have migrated to the towns.

In addition it is possible that the nnemployed

migrants will have a different utility fnnction from those who find employment.
Item (1) requires that such 'true utility' indicators will have to be transformed
into von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions (which incorporate attitudes
towards risk) if it is to be claimed that workers maximise expected utility.
Thus the unemployed will have a (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility given by:
V • V (D)
u

(5)

u

The utilities of the agricultural and manufacturing workers are given
by:
VA• VA(D + F'A)

(6)

M • VM(D + WM)

(7)

V

The migration equilibrium condition is that the average utility level
in the economy is equal to the utility level in agriculture, for otherwise
expected utility maximising workers will migrate:
(8)
(9)

where i is an index that runs over u,A,M, L is the number of nnemployed
u

migrants.
The utility functions can differ in their origins (representing
differences in non-pecuniary advantages) and in their slopes (representing
differences in both non-pecuniary advantages and the cost of living).
if the workers are risk averse, each function will be concave.

It will

Also,

-6be shown that none of these three characteristics , which affect migration,
have any role in determining whether or not the shadow wage equals the actual
wage.

This implies that the level of migration is irrelevant to the question

of whether the shadow wage should equal the actual wage.
It is now necessary to specify the government's objective function.
First, consider the case of the migrants.

The ex ante expected utility of

each migrant is given by:

However, ex post some migrants have the utility Vu and some the utility
V.
m

The question is whether the government should be interested in the

ex ante or the ex post utility levels.

This paper will assume that the

government is concerned only with the ex ante expected utility.
that

The view

is embodied in this judgement is that the government should not

mind if people voluntarily take risks and lose:
be paternalistic.

the government should not

If, instead, it was thought that the government should

discourage risk taking and thus be especially concerned about the migrants
who fail to find jobs, it is straightforward to show that the shadow wage
8
should be even higher than the conclusions of this paper would indicate.
We know from the migration condition that the ex ante expected utility
of migrants will equal the certain utility of non migrants.

There is, therefore,

no reason to put more weight on the expected utility of migrants rather than non9

migrants or vice versa. Thus the government's objective function is:
8rhe higher shadow wage would reduce employment and thus the inducement to migrate.
9 rhe results below do not, of course, depend on the additive separability
of (10) as any differentiable function can be taken to be additively separable
in a given neighbourhood.

-7-

(10)
It should be noted that, in contrast to the national income.the objective
function (10) embodies those elements of individual utilities that reduce the
level of migration below that predicted by Harris and Todaro.

The risk

aversion is represented by the fact that the ex ante expected utility of
migrants is less than the utility of the expected wage, as a result of the
concavity of Vu and VM.

The cost of living and non-pecuniary advantages

of agricultural life are represented by a higher value of VA than VM or
Vu for

any given level of income.

The problem for the government project evaluator is to choose the
employment level in manufacturing (and thus the shadow wage) so as to
maxiinl,se(l0) subject to equations (3) - (9). 10 In order to derive necessary
conditions for the solution of this problem, we form the Lagrangian.
L=

>.:

i

LiVi + >..(VA - t LiVi) + $(1 - t Li)
i

+ ~(FA - LAF'A + FM -

i

~WM -

D)

(11)

The first-order conditions are:
(12)

aL = V (1->..) -$ + ~(F'

3LM

M

M

-

W)
M

=0

(13)

lOThis formulation assumes that the government controls all of the
manufacturing sector. However, this is not essential to the result.

-8-

aL • (1-A) EL V' + AV' - •1•
an
ii
A
~
i

- 6

(14)

0

(15)

•

where primes denote first-order derivatives and double primes denote
second-order derivatives.
In orderto interpret thoses conditions, note that the migration
condition, equation·(B), can be written as:

Substituting (12), (13), (14) into (16), we obtain:

(17)

Remembering equation (9), we can rewrite equation (17):
~

1-LA

V' F" (l.

(W~_F'M) • L F"
}r

A A

-

A

A

+
1j,

L (1 - A))

(18)

A

It is equation (18) that provides the basic result of this paper.

In

order to simplify the interpreta::ion, assume first that F"A • 0 .so that

the marginal product of labor in agriculture is constant.
the right-hand side of the equation is zero.

In this case

The left hand side of the

equation is the difference between the wage in manufacturing and the
marginal product, the wage subsidy in manufacturing, multiplied by the
proportion of the urban work force that is employed in manufacturing.
Thus, this equation states that the subsidy to employment should be zero.
This means that the shadow wage in manufacturing should equal the market
wage.

-9The basic intuition behind this result is that, when there are no
'subsidies, the average marginal product of labor in each sector plus the
equally distributed profits and rents are supporting the same average
utility level.

Therefore, if people are moved from one sector to another,

diminishing returns in manufacturing will ensure that this level of
average utility cannot be maintained.
In order for this argument to work precisely, it is necessary to
equate the average marginal product in the urban sector - ½1F'M/(½1
with the "marginal product of a migrant":

+ Lu) -

the extra output produced in

the urban sector when one extra person migrates.

It is this condition that

is upset when there is a diminishing marginal product in agriculture, because
migration out of agriculture will-raise the agricultural wage and thus,
via the migration condition, reduce the proportion of migrants who remain
I

•

unemployed.

In this case, the "marginal product of a migrant" will be

greater than the average marginal product in the urban sector and migration
_,,,

would be beneficial.

It is this effect that is represented by the right

hand side in equation (18).
This argument suggests that the right hand side of equation (18) is
positive of F"A is negative.

This can be confirmed by writing equation

(15) as:

V'A(A + LA(l- A))=

ip-

(1- A)

E LiV'i
i~A

(19)

Substituting (19) into (18), we obtain:

~

1

-L

A

-

(WM - F' )= -(1-L )F"
A
A
M

+

F"

A

(20)

-10From equations (13) and (14) note that:
W. - F'
M
M

----vM - Vu

(21)

Substituting (21) into (20), we obtain:

1'M

-

(WM - F' ) • _
---1 1A
H

(1 - L ) F"
A
A

+

F"

E

~ i-lA

L V'

i

WM - F'M

(22)

i VM - Vu

As expected, the first term on the right hand side of equation (22)

requires a subsidy in manufacturing.

However, the final term reduces the

size of the subsidy in manufacturing, although it can never eliminate it.
Thus equation (18) does call for a subsidy to manufacturing.

However,

the advisability of such a subsidy is unrelated to the modifications that
have been introduced in this paper to explain a lower level of migration
than that predicted by Harris and Todaro.

This is shown by the fact that

even if individuals' utilities equalled their wages (the assumption used
by Harris and Todaro) equation (22) would still require a subsidy.

Also,

no subsidy would be required if F"A"" 0 however low the level of migration.
Thus we see that the level of migration has no effect on whether or not
there should be a wage subsidy in manufacturing.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that under circumstances considerably more
general than those of the original Harris-Todaro model, but more re
strictive in requiring a constant marginal product in agriculture, the
shadow wage should equal the market wage in manufacturing.

The importance

of this result is not that it prescribes a particular shadow wage.
all, if the marginal product in agriculture is not constant, a lower

After
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shadow wage is indicated.

What is important is that it has been shown that

mere observation of unemployment rates lower than those predicted by Harris
and Todaro does not imply that the shadow wage in manufacturing should be
lower than the market wage.
The implication of this is that people should look more closely at
why nnemployment is lower than predicted by Harris and Todaro.

If the

reason is that the migration mechanism is fundamentally different from that of Harris
and Todaro, the results of this paper may not apply.

If, however, it is

risk aversion or differences in the cost of living that are reducing migration,
the argument for a low shadow wage is incorrect.

Thus, to the extent that

people have not distinguished between different causes of low migration,
the shadow wage should be higher than is often thought.
All of the formal analysis rested on the assumption that workers in
agriculture are paid their marginal products.
not essential.

Strictly speaking, this is

What is necessary is that individuals should make their

migration decisions on the basis of their marginal products. 11 Thus, in a
family farm where everybody receives the average product, the family will
still consider an individual member's marginal product before deciding
whether he should migrate.

Similarly, it is the marginal product that

counts if the whole family moves and can sell the land.

However, it is

possible to construct examples where workers' migration decisions are not
based on their marginal product.
11

In such a case, the result of this paper

It is for this reason that we assumed that workers continued to
receive rent from their land after they migrated.

-12would have to be modified.
Finally, it is worth considering two modifications to the migration
mechanism in order to test how robust the result is.

One simple D)di

ficatl.onis to assume that unsuccessful migrants find jobs in the unorgan
ized sector but at much lower wages than those in modern manufacturing.
So long as the marginal product of labor in these activities does not
diminish, this modification really just consists of raising the value of
Vu for any value of D.

Thus the result is unchanged. However, if the
.
12
marginal product does diminish, a subsidy is required.
The other modification is to assume, following Sen (1975), that
migrants do not have the same pa,obability of employment as somebody who
has been an urban worker for some time.
a job.

Instead, they have to "queue" for

Stiglitz (1974) shows that the equilibrium conditions for this

sort of model are very similar to those of the Harris-Todaro model, unless
the labor force is growing fast or the workers have high rates of time
discount.

Thus our result is approximately correct.

These two examples show that slight modifications to the migration
mechanism will produce slight modifications to the formal results.
the main point of this paper remains:

However,

project evaluators should look more

closely at the cause of low migration before using it as a justification for
low shadow wages.

The unwarranted use of low shadow wages can reduce the

well-being of the population even if it increases the value of the national
income.

12

The reason for this is that, with a diminishing marginal product
in the unorganized sector, an increase in the urban workforce will lower
the wage in the unorganized sector. This will reduce migration and increase
L /(r.__ + L) in the same manner as an increased wage in agriculture when
M -M
u'
F"A is negative.

-13-
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